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RECENT DECISIONS
C.P.A. § 522; FED. R Civ. P. 6(c) for statutory incorporations of
the rule.
This writer believes the decision in the instant case is sound.
The petitioners in fact were not subject to a trial on the merits
when the chief witness refused to testify. A strict application of
res judicata in a field where it is usually known only in a modified
form, would be to destroy altogether the usefulness of the police
commissioner's board. The continuing public interest in the in-
tegrity of public servants demands, at the very least, that newly
available evidence be presented to official scrutiny and evaluation.
Frank Dombrowski, Jr.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-A WIDENING OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Proceeding by an employment agency operator to annul a
cease and desist order of the State Commission Against Discrim-
ination (S. C. A. D.). The Commission moved to compel the
operator to comply. with its order. Held: Order affirmed upon a
finding by the court that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the
Commission's determination of unlawful employment practices.
Holland v. Edwards, 282 App. Div. 353, 122 N. Y. S. 2d 721 (1st
Dep't 1953).
After accepting the determination of the Commission, the
court states that it may make any order which it deems should
have been made. The court declares that its scope of review, in
this case, is broader than that admissible under C. P. A. Art. 78.
As a general rule, the reviewing court's function is exhausted
after finding a rational basis for the conclusions 6if the adminis-
trative body and sufficient evidence in the record to warrant such
conclusions. Universal Camera Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 340 U. S. 474
(1951) ; Board v. Hearst Publication., 322 U. S. 111 (1943) ; Matter
of Mounting c Finishing Co. v. McGoldrick, 294 N. Y. 104, 60
N. E. 2d 825 (1945). Thus, in an appeal by the Labor Relations
Board to reinstate its determination, the court declared that where
more than one reasonable inference could be drawn from the evi-
dence presented, the decision of the Board will not be upset. Matter
of Stork Restaurant v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256, 26 N. E. 2d 247
(1940).
Petitioners in a recent case asserted that the Board of Regents
had dealt too severely with them and had ignored weighty consid-
erations in suspending their license to practice medicine. The
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court, affirming the Board's action, declared, "[I]t is enough to
say that we are wholly without jurisdiction to review such ques-
tions." Barsky v. Board of Regents of University of New York,
305 N. Y. 89, 99, 111 N. E. 2d 222, 226 (1953). Thus, even in the
disciplinary area, the court refused to widen its scope of review.
See 3 BrLo. L. R-Fv. 56.
The declaration by the court, in the instant case, of the power
of review which it possesses over S. C. A. D. transcends the ac-
customed view of judicial review in New York. The statute setting
up this agency declares that "the court shall have the power to
grant such temporary relief of restraining order as it deems
proper, and to make and enter . . . an order enforcing, modifying,
and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part
the order of the Commission." N. Y. EXECUTIVw LAW § 298. The
court indicates that it is this statute which instigates a departure
from the ordinary type of judicial review as provided for in
C. P. A. Art. 78. However, reference to this Article reveals very
little difference, if any, in the scope of review provided therein.
It states that "the court may annul or confirm, wholly or partly,
or modify the determination reviewed, . . . and may direct appro-
priate action or inaction by the respondent (administrative
agency)." N. Y. C. P. A. Art. 78, § 1300.
It is submitted that, because of the striking similarity of
wording in the two sections, little precedent value should be placed




Defendants were convicted of murder. At their trial, confes-
sions, alleged to have been coerced, were admitted in evidence.
The question of coercion was left to the jury under the charge to
consider them only if they were found to be voluntary. Held (6-3)
affirming: (1) the jury could reasonably have found that the con-
fessions were voluntary: (2) it was not a violation of due process
for the judge to refuse to charge that the jury must acquit if it
found that the confessions were coerced. Stein v. New York, 346
U. S. 156 (1953).
The first case in which the United States Supreme Court re-
versed a state conviction involving the use of a coerced confession
held that due process, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
146
